

## CHINA CONFERENCE INFORMATION

Harold V. Hall

Tentative title: **WMD-related Paradigmatic Shifts Utilizing Violence Risk Analysis and Positive Force Multipliers (PFMs)**

**ABSTRACT:** *This outlier conference involves examination of psychological concepts and systems as they apply to the prediction of critical events in a nation's history followed by intervention designed to inhibit the possible use of WMD. The most accurate predictions are those that utilize formal decision rules, and are based on accurate predictions for a previous temporal period (see below 62 predictions for 2012-13). The most durable and ultimately best inhibitors to violence are held to be positive force multipliers (PFMs) that avoid punishment and threat of punishment, psychologically defined, outside reasonable exceptions such as self-defense. Use of PFMs as inhibitors encourages, for both individual and societal applications, increased intrinsic and extrinsic reward for citizens, group cohesion, reliability and stability, as well as provides the foundation for increased trust and positive bonding in conflict resolution efforts with other nations (see e-mailed chapter on inhibitions to violence from Collective Violence). The benefits of such a conference may be delayed but are designed to increase choice and self-control in a nation's psychohistory in the face of possible conflict with other countries.*

WHO SPONSORS EVENT? The Pacific Institute for the Study of Conflict and Aggression, Hawaii, co-sponsored by Center for American Studies, Fudan University. Opinions and positions expressed by presenters from the Pacific Institute should not be attributed to any other source or organization.

WHO PRESENTS? (1) Dr. Dengli Shen, Professor, Fudan University, Executive Dean of Fudan University's Institute of International Studies, and Director of the Center for American Studies, (2) Lt Gen (Ret) Pan Zhianqiang, Vice President of the China Foundation for International Studies and Academic Changes, and formerly Director of the Institute for Strategic Services at NDU of China in Beijing, (3) Dr. Harold Hall, neuropsychologist and director of the Pacific Institute for the Study of Conflict and Aggression in Kamuela, Hawaii, and (4) Possibly, at a maximum, 1-2 additional presenters from the Pacific Institute.

WHO PARTICIPATES? Preferably, an interdisciplinary, open audience will

participate. CAS will approve the participants of the conference.

WHAT? Within a transparent format (i.e., no classified material), this conference will explore (1) alternative views of predictions of anticipated events within critical time periods (2013-2029), and (2) possible positive force multipliers (PFMs) that act as inhibitors of violence with WMD over the next 18 years. This conference will focus on WMD—particularly nuclear weapon issues, from a psychological perspective involving violence risk analysis and developing inhibitions to violence on both an individual and collective basis.

CONTENT AND SEQUENCE: Four sequentially presented areas are proposed:

- (1) Opening Address—Dr. Dingli Shen
- (2) Keynote Address—Lt Gen Pan Zhiaqiang
- (3) Predictions for Critical Time Periods for US – Dr. Harold Hall  
Previously predicted baseline events: 1991, 2003, 2012  
August 2012 to Dec 2013: Onset of conflict with Iran  
January 2013—December 2014: Onset of economic crash & sequellae  
January 2013—December 2014: Onset of 8-10 year depression  
2021 and 2026: Earliest and latest years that depression morphs into crisis.  
2020s: Crisis event, Crisis climax, Resolution, Transformation, 5 different possible results; new long cycle begins
- (4) First Exercise: Formation of Teams for critical time periods—all presenters and all participants;
- (5) Second exercise: Modification of postdictions for 2012 and 2013—all participants with team leaders
- (6) Third Exercise: Inhibitions using PFMs for each critical time periods—all participants;
- (7) Fourth Exercise: Preparation for the next long cycle;
- (8) Feedback session, Q and A; discussion of future conferences for each critical time period, and discussion of optional edited text or a text of conference papers—all presenters and all participants., lead by Dr. Shen and Lt. Gen. Zhiaqiang.

WHEN: Two or three 1-3 day workshops Jan-May or Sept-November 2013  
(PLEASE INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE WITHIN THIS TIME FRAME)

WHERE: Shanghai, and 1-2 other locations in China as preferred.

HOW: Didactic, experiential groups, extra-conference focus task groups and possibly an edited work after the conference (see below).

WHY: Extant WMD issues have not been resolved through conflict resolution strategies utilizing punishment and threat of punishment, psychologically defined. The best possible outcome of this outlier conference would be to start a controlled movement towards win-win outcomes in conflict issues between various nations, switching from a negative to a positive paradigm for conflict resolution. The means to effect this switch are twofold: (1) developing accurate prediction models so the future can be reasonably forecasted during critical temporal periods, and plan/apply what needs to be done given this anticipated state of affairs. Analyzing the accuracy of predictions after a given temporal period allows for a measure of effectiveness of prognostication and keeps the feedback loop for modification open and robust (dependent variable in behavioral science), and (2) applying positive force multipliers instead of negative sanctions, threats, and other punishment procedures such as withholding acts/events which may have a higher probability of achieving alternatives to possible WMD usage in future conflict between nations. The present conference supports other efforts to address WMD usage and in no way challenges their continued good work.

LOGISTICS: There is no charge for to anyone for anything on the part of the Pacific Institute. This includes presenter or sponsor preparation, travel and related expenses. It is understood that there will be no charge for the training facility. Faculty lodging for Dr. Hall and 1-2 other Pacific Institute staff may be considered given available quarters. The Pacific Institute will award Dr. Shen, LT Gen Zhianqiang a honorarium for their assistance in conducting this workshop. Materials for participants, if any and if desired, shall be produced by the Center for American Studies. Costs of editing, coordination, printing and distribution of a published text or collection of conference papers, if a published work is considered, shall be borne by Fudan University. All royalties from this (optional) edited text for the conference, if any, shall be retained in perpetuity by Fudan University and the PRC. A conference website may be constructed for this event, and needs to be discussed in terms of logistics unless, preferentially, existing websites and e-mail contact addresses are utilized for participants to register.

---

Concept paper below presented after opening addresses.

---

## WMD-related Paradigmatic Shifts Utilizing Violence Risk Analysis and Positive Force Multipliers (PFMs)

### Harold Hall

Thank you for the honor of presenting on such an important topic in our conflict resolution efforts.

For at least 1000 years it has been known that the 3 primary building blocks of personality for individuals are **feelings, thoughts and behaviors**. But what about human interaction? For example, violence is always an interactional phenomenon. About 50 years ago US psychologists conducted a massive research program in order to determine the 3 most important building blocks of human interaction. What do you think contributes the most?

[Field guesses at this time].

The 3 interactional building blocks are, in order of importance, **affection, control, and social activity**. These 3 are broken down into 2 levels: what people do versus what they want.

[Describe FIRO-B 2 x 3 contingency table for 6 factor analyzed items and give examples. It's easy. You can analyze anyone individually or when interacting with others. You will use this quick and valid measure throughout this workshop]

[Mention list in materials of psychological and other terms].

[WMD story—1957 when witnessed atomic blast in Nevada and the psychological reaction of peers and teachers to it]

This conference is outside the box and not considered typical or usual in the discussion of WMD issues. I will talk about findings from behavioral science research, and observations that, in my opinion, may have relevance to conflict resolution and possibly nuclear issues. My input focuses on 2 subfields of behavioral science--**violence risk analysis** for individuals and collectivities, and **strengthening inhibitions to individual and institutional violence**.

Let's have a common language of communication insofar as psychology is concerned. On a list are psychological concepts, definitions and examples I will use in this training.

We need to talk about prediction. There is a wide divergence in anticipation of future history. The reason has to do with the key components of prediction,

called **HOT** factors. **History** as in background, **Opportunity** factors, such as weapons, availability of goals, as in a target-rich environment, transport and communication, and **Triggers**, short-term in nature and intense in impact, and which set violence into motion. Inhibitions are found within each factor. Despite its foundational linkage to intervention, most prediction for collectivities is worthless. According to a 20-year study in Philip Tetlocks's award-winning Expert Political Judgment, the accuracy of 80,000 predictions was only slightly better than chance. Many are not even predictions, failing to specify a precise temporal period or an unambiguous language for verification. Three of the most common mistakes involve (1) **hindsight bias**, the tendency to view events as more predictable than they are, (2) predicting in the direction of desired outcome—in particular vested interest or political correctness; and (3) being overly influenced by recent events rather than baseline performance. A fourth, often overlooked, source of error stems from the confusion of **prediction based on trends versus cycles**. Examples of the trend-based predictions, or growth guesses, include forecasting increasing heat during daylight hours, lowered GDP for a country as its birth rate declines, and the continuation of limited wars.

[An **algorithm for trend-based predictions** for repeated limited wars is enclosed in the first appendix] It can be used for your first exercise.

Examples of cyclic-based prediction, of primary interest to the Pacific Institute, includes predicting different temperatures as a function of season of the year, higher GDP as a 50-year K-economic cycle plays out, and whether a general war, also termed hegemonic war, world war, and total war and, in recent decades, all-out-thermonuclear war (AOTW), may occur within a distinct temporal period. A general war is due less than 80 years from the end of WWII. Why is that?

The methodology for cyclic-based prediction is different than trend-based prediction. It involves analysis of a longer baseline period of cyclic repetitions and, because of their repetitive nature, cycles are easier to predict than growth trends. The timing has to be right. In the US, the last two “**long cycles**” have averaged about 82 years in duration since the American Civil War, dropping down from about 100 years at the time of the Glorious Revolution and 92 years at the time of the American Revolution. The most recent long cycle **crisis climax**—WWII-

-for the US was in 1944 and is projected to hit its crisis climax in 80 or fewer years since the last crisis climax.

Notice that the time from one crisis climax to another is getting shorter, probably due to cumulative and breakthrough improvements in technology--transportation, communication, information systems, weaponry-- and therefore we predict that the next crisis climax will follow the pattern, most likely occurring, if it does at all, since there are multiple possible futures, within a few years of the mid-2020s.

[display chart of findings of different investigators using different means—generations, economics, war sequence data—converging on the 2020s as the most likely decade of the next transformation]

Every long cycle in the West has ended in a **resolution** following a general war, at which time the world polity has been rearranged. [Every country has their own long cycle; only the UK avoided a general war in its 5 long cycles). The timing may be right, using a cyclic rationale, for a general war to occur during the 2020s, not now. This may partially explain why we haven't had a general war since the 1940s. People, leaders, and nations in the West aren't ready for it. Perhaps the intervention efforts, MAD reasoning, etc have not done anything. It was simply too early in the mindset of people and leaders for a general war.

During 2013-2014 it is predicted that the US will experience a perfect economic storm, including a crash, trade wars, currency wars and currency devaluation, more erosion of the middle class, continual conflict in our limited wars, further loss of civil liberties, and increasing stress at home, followed by a "**Great Recession**" equal to or worse than the Great Depression and of comparable length. From my perspective, this debacle became irreversible after the Afghanistan surge. Certainly by now, it is almost predetermined. For one, do the math. It is virtually impossible to pay off our indebtedness.

For the 2020s we predict a decade a **Great Transformation** for American society. Briefly, the Great Recession will continue for 8-10 years until a crisis begins to form. Civic power by this time has reached its maximum strength. At this time general war, revolution, or some other huge event becomes likely. Adversaries are perceived by the leaders of each nation in moral terms, the leaders refusing compromise, showing an instant and intense readiness to enforce the values of the

extant regime military. Any sacrifice by individuals for the nation will be acceptable. The draft having been long reinstated, forces are martialled for conflict. This conflict in the transformational phase of the long cycle is termed the crisis climax.

Unfortunately, at the crisis climax of a long cycle every superpower in history has employed the most destructive weapons at their disposal. For leaders, stress is up and flexibility/creativity is down. For these and other reasons including the locking in of decision rules for missile launches, designed to reduce human subjectivity, hesitation and delay, it is entirely possible that the outbreak of a general war, if one happens, could quickly engulf the entire planet. Conditions which increase the risk of AOTW include the triggering effects of asymmetric conflict, the MAD logic, AI and IT applications of WMD, and the idiosyncratic notions of the Nuclear Posture Review, all used as only some examples. From a psychological perspective, the mental rigidity of leaders at the time of the crisis climax comes at the worst time, when sound human judgment is needed.

A question emerges. How can we divert national energy and time and effort into systematic and potent alternatives to a general war? History shows that built-in inhibitors to wars across the centuries must be in place 5-10 years before the crisis climax. Have we passed that point already?

If we survive the 2020s, the resolution as always will designate the winners and losers, and set the tone for the next long cycle. Events of the 2020s will determine the outcome and characteristics of the remainder of the 21<sup>st</sup> century for the entire world.

The US will be faced with five possible outcomes of the transformation, all but one negative ranging from positive globalization and security, static conditions (unlikely), fragmentation or weaker US, end of modernity (especially if EMP and other negative super negative FMs are utilized, and AOTW). Best guess is that a point between the two extremes is likely with limited WMD usage.

[Present slide of 5 possible outcomes of the transformational event]

**Examples of findings from the psychological research that may have relevance in conflict resolution follow:**

1. A previous history of violence correlates highly with future violence, whether you are dealing with an individual or a collectivity.  
  
[Provide examples for each]. There have been 4 for the US since 9-11 including GWOT, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, with a high likelihood of number 5 against Iran to start 2012-2013.
2. Micro-violence and macro-violence are functionally similar and tend to potentiate each other.
3. The best predictor of violence is a combination of a **H**istory of multiple and recent violence, within the last 2 years, along with **O**pportunity and **T**riggers to violence. You ask yourself if the HOT factors are present.
4. Failure to rule out or account for **unintentional distortion** (e.g., incomplete, misleading information) or **intentional deception** (e.g., camouflage, stealth technology) renders useless a violence prediction, or more charitably, below acceptable levels of statistical confidence.
5. Failure to analyze the possible initiator of violence, the recipient of violence, and the context in which it is likely to occur, all operating within a distinct time period, prevents understanding the key contributions to violence.
6. Violence is always a choice after costs are weighed and nonviolent options are excluded.
7. Interventions that respond violently to violent events lead to self-generating **violence interlocks**, or **aversive cycles**.

Almost a century of psychological research has shown that human **punishment** procedures, defined as the presentation or threat of noxious stimuli, or the withholding of rewards, has at least 3 negative effects. The controlling effects of punishment are temporary, their use communicates that their usage is acceptable, and they incite revenge or at least counteraction. Blame attribution studies are clear: Members of each side blame the other for the worst punishing stimulus or worse history of weapon usage.

Control and national survival are equated with the use of punishment and threat of punishment through WMD and a velvetized MAD mentality, alive and well, despite progress in reduction efforts. Possession of nuclear weapons implies a decision to use them if certain conditions are met. Otherwise deterrence has no meaning. Often,



improvement in reduction is equated with number of nuclear-tipped missiles, a favorable ratio of tactical and strategic nuclear warheads, and other external events, rather than in the minds of people who are connected to policy or action.

An impediment to progress is an interlocking aversive cycle. Even when nuclear armed nations, or nations aspiring to develop nuclear weapons, agree on content, they don't implement needed measures.

From a psychological perspective, nuclear-armed nations are like a dysfunctional family where the members, each powerful in his or her own way, are interlocked in pathological ways of interacting. Each member is unable to change the family matrix, it remains interlocking, pathological, but with deep dependencies on the other members. No member is the real patient; the system itself is sick. The only known treatment for dysfunctional families is to treat the matrix as a whole. The only chance of changing a interlocking interacting system of nuclear armed nations is outside of the system by a superordinate agency.

8. Reframing and redirecting our violent mindsets require transcending violent interlocks to cycles of affection and gratitude. Appreciating our adversaries, training our youth in altruism and advocacy of others, especially of disadvantaged others, unilateral trust, are all to be considered to ultimately break those interlocks.

First you must know yourself and your own strengths, and know others and their strengths, before you presume to influence others. Character and cognitive traits are durable. There are 24 primary character traits that translate into strengths. I would like you to consider taking a test to determine the rank order of your character strengths. Before taking the test, try to predict how you will score. Try it tonight if possible so you can use the results in your exercises.

This is explained in [www.authentichappiness.org](http://www.authentichappiness.org) The same is true of groups and nations. They do what they want to do, in accordance to their wishes and needs. Would it not be good if leaders of nuclear armed nations knew their own strengths and assets?

[instruct participants how to log onto website without identifying themselves in any manner]

Except for raising children and other special cases, you cannot change human behavior. People do pretty much what they want to do. As a

corollary, you can't change your feelings. They come and go. Thoughts are ephemeral. You can change your own behavior some of the time under some circumstances. The rule is not to try to change others. Rely on others who already have the traits you desire to interact with.

**Inhibitions to violence** occur at 3 levels: Extra-institutional, Intra-institutional, and Intra-individual. As stated, the best inhibitions to violence as FMs. These include, as examples: (1) teaching empathy, tolerance, compassion, and personal responsibility at home, in schools, and in society generally; (2) leaders actively reviewing complaints and grievances informally or formally. The justice system a nation employs should be a top priority to maintain a positive and resilient mindset among the people. Reviewing suggestions for change is an integral part of this process, especially suggestions where the giver feels safe in rendering his or her observations; (3) cultivating diversity in order to take in a broad variety of personal viewpoints and opinions; (4) examining one's own tendencies to project and displace hostility versus accepting personal responsibility and contributing to the general welfare; (5) taking periodic leaves of absence from the institution in order to look more objectively at it and to belong elsewhere as a broadening experience; (6) Relating with others within the same institution as a reality check—peers, supervisors, and others at the work site; (7) developing a strong support system. Friends are silver, family is gold, and a passionate embrace of one's profession makes life joyful and worthwhile; and (8) reaching out to educate, bond with and support others, particularly those who are disadvantaged or least expect it. Continuing education and seeing oneself as a lifetime learner is one of the most potent inhibitors to violence known.

**[Distribute e-mailed chapter by Whitaker on inhibitions to violence if printed off by FU]**

Are the leaders of nuclear weapon nations motivated to give up their weapons within the foreseeable future? Ironically most leaders do see the same increasing danger from general war by accident, design or **misattribution** (launching nuclear weapons and disguising the source) as other leaders. This risk of untoward consequences is increasing as a function of the increasing number of nuclear-armed nations, degradation in maintenance of existing nuclear weapon systems, the likely occurrence of momentous political events, the hair-trigger the nature of launch sequences, where human judgment is no longer a factor in the decision process, and the underlying acceptability of nuclear war given certain criteria. One criterion is the right time in

history—the 2020s—which is fast approaching. Non-nuclear nations are anxious to reap the many benefits of nuclear status. This is reality. You are unlikely to change these behaviors. Go ahead and try. But save energy for your efforts in ascertaining the future and applying PFMs as discussed above.

Okay, let's go to work.

**[END OF CONCEPT PAPER FOR FIRST HH SESSION]**

---

## Appendices:

---

**APPENDIX 1. An algorithm created by the Pacific Institute correctly predicted several hundred acts of individual violence from the 1980s. A number of these predictions survived the acid test of cross-evaluation in criminal court. The 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War and the Iraq invasion in 2003 was correctly predicted using this algorithm. Using the same, we predict that it is highly likely the US/Israel will attack Iran during the last half of 2012, possibly as late as 2013. The best (political) guess that this war will commence is by late Summer or early Fall but at least one month prior to the US elections in November.**

The plain-English algorithm for predicting individual or collective violence follows:

**HAVE YOU SPECIFIED A DISTINCT TIME SPAN FOR YOUR PREDICTION?** If not, then do not proffer a prediction. If yes (e. g., violence within one year; imminent violence within one year), continue with the steps;

**HAS (UNINTENTIONAL) DISTORTION OR (DELIBERATE) DECEPTION BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT?** If not, predictions cannot be proffered. No collected information should not be taken at face value. If yes, first specify the kind of distortion uncovered (e. g., dull normal intelligence; cumulative extreme stress). Evaluate for the presence or absence of

**distortion displayed by the predictee, target and all others providing information.**

**DOES THE POSSIBLE PERPETRATOR/COLLECTIVITY/GROUP HAVE A VIOLENCE HISTORY?** If not, the only prediction that should be made is that no violence will occur. If yes, list by date and circumstances. Look for patterns that suggest a target typology and the usual context of violent interaction. Acts of violence by non-leaders in a highly cohesive, suspicious, punitive, lethal organization (e.g. terrorist cell; one-person dictatorship) are counted for the violence history of the leader himself or herself. Followers in these types of organizations identify with the leader, or at least comply with the desires of the leader, or they do not survive. A prepotent history of violence is signified by a recent act of violence—within two years—and a second recent or a remote act of violence, remote being more than two years when it occurred. When the criteria for a prepotent history of violence is fulfilled and the remainder of the criteria are positive, almost always a true positive prediction will result (correctly predicting violence will occur). Go on to next step;

**HAVE YOU SPECIFIED TRIGGERING STIMULI, INTENSE IN IMPACT AND SHORT-TERM IN DURATION, WHICH ACTS TO SET VIOLENCE INTO MOTION?** If not, refuse to predict unless the predictee displays violence that does not appear associated with stress and is a function of opportunity (e.g., psychopath for individual violence; triggers are not needed in organizations where obedience to authority is absolute). If yes, list the triggers and continue;

**SPECIFY OPPORTUNITY VARIABLES WHICH MAKE VIOLENCE POSSIBLE OR WHICH EXPAND THE CHANCE OF ITS OCCURANCE.** If not, refuse to predict. Weapons, transportation, communication, release from a restricted area and target availability are key opportunity variables for both individual and collective violence. List opportunity variables for the predictee and continue;

**SPECIFY INHIBITORY VARIABLES, WHICH MAY LOWER THE CHANCES VIOLENCE, WILL OCCUR.** If not, refuse to predict. Inhibitory variables range from certainty that negative sanctions will follow violent behavior to having bonded/familial relationships with the target. If inhibitory variables have been considered, proceed to conclusions.

**BASED ON THE ABOVE, FORMULATE THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS** (Place conclusions in binary or quantitative format for easy verification)

- 1. ARE CONCLUSIONS PROFFERED WITH A REASONABLE DEGREE OF [DISCIPLINE] CERTAINTY? If not, then do not present conclusions unless referral source will accept a lesser standard of certainty;**
- 2. DID UNINTENTIONAL DISTORTION AFFECT RESULTS? If they did, show how you have taking the unintentional distortion into account;**
- 3. SPECIFY THE DECEPTIVE STYLES UTILIZED—HONESTY, FAKING GOOD, FAKING BAD, INVALIDATION AND COMBINATION STYLES? If deliberate deception is present, take the results into account or do not offer conclusions, as the risk of error will be unacceptably high. A specified style is not considered cross-validated unless supported by AT LEAST 6 INDICATORS, which corresponds to a low probability of chance occurrence;**
- 2. WHAT IS THE PROBABILITY VIOLENCE WILL OCCUR WITHIN SPECIFIED TIME RANGE? State whether the probability is negligible, minimal, mild, moderate, considerable, or substantial. Specify the numerical range denoted by each level of probability if supported by statistical data or actuarial measures of violence);**
- 2. WHAT ARE THE KEY FACTORS IN COMBINATION THAT FORMED YOUR CONCLUSIONS? Some events in combination may weigh more than others and should be specified (e. g., credible threats to kill combined with victim availability and a multiple history of violence; for collectivities, massing of troops on border of target-country combined with a stated intention to attack the enemy within a certain time frame). Specify these factors and the numerical range of risk if supported by base-rate data.**
- 3. WHO OR WHAT ARE THE MOST LIKELY TARGETS? The likely target(s) of violence by the predictee (e.g., work supervisor; terrorist leader, heavy equipment) should be identified. The past history of the predictee should reveal targeting patterns.**
- 4. SPECIFY THE ANTICIPATED USE OF WEAPONS BY PREDICTEE. Type of weapon(s) based on history, proficiencies, availability and current training should be noted. Failure to identify weapons and armaments of both the predictee and his/her likely targets may render the entire prediction process useless;**
- 5. SPECIFY ANTICIPATED HARM BY PREDICTEE IF SUCCESSFUL. This ranges from no harm, for negligible risk of violence, to threats, minor injury, moderate injury, death, and multiple deaths;**
- 6. WHAT IS YOUR CERTAINTY LEVEL FOR THIS PREDICTION? State your confidence in your prediction, ranging from negligible, minimal, mild, moderate, and substantial;**

**7. WHAT IS YOUR FEEDBACK MECHANISM TO REASSESS CONCLUSIONS? Recommend the type of assessment independent evaluators to reassess the accuracy of your prediction, even if repeated measures are utilized;**

**8. SPECIFY POSSIBLE LOW-PROBABILITY CHANGES IN PERPETRATOR, VICTIM OR CONTEXT FACTORS WHICH WOULD CHANGE YOUR PREDICTION.**

**Note: More than 50 investigations over the last 60 years have shown that individual judgment and intuition are inferior to formal decision analysis.**

-----  
-

**APPENDIX 2. The following sets of predictions for the US for 2012:**

**As a negative prediction, no global war, economic crash, unmanageable natural disaster, or end-of-time scenario will occur. The 20 predictions for the remainder of 2012 rest on findings that Americans are increasingly stressed in their country. This increases their willingness to act in ways to reduce that anxiety. In this country, there will be ostensibly positive changes and emotional ups and downs, mostly downs, for the beleaguered American worker and those without a job. Deception and distortion of information will be more prevalent and robust than usual in an important election year. If the above predictions are borne out, no real changes will take place in this country or in Congress during 2012. Except for expedient legislation, gridlock in Congress will continue. Congressional abrogation of responsibility to declare war will be masked by a lot of posturing and perhaps a joint resolution to approve funding for limited operations against Iran. Presidential and congressional candidates will express optimism and confidence in the future and present themselves as competent crisis managers. The population may be distracted by the conflict in Iran, if that war has started. Artificial means will prevent a badly fractured economy from collapsing in an election year. War veterans nonetheless will return to a harsh job market and an overwhelmed health care system.**

- 1. American forces in Afghanistan decrease to 60-70 thousand or less;**
- 2. The cost of gasoline and other petroleum-based products increases 20-25% or more;**

- 3. Gasoline will cost \$5 to \$6 a gallon or more. This prediction has already been confirmed in some parts of the country;**
- 4. Food costs increase at least 15%;**
- 5. The average American income remains flat, plus or minus a few thousand dollars, except for the top 10% of the wage earners;**
- 6. Home values across the US lose 10% or more of their value on average;**
- 7. Up to 1/3 of homes in the U.S. plunge under water, where more is owed that can be obtained by selling on the open market;**
- 8. Foreclosures increase 10%;**
- 9. The 23-25 million persons--unemployed, underemployed, or discouraged drop outs—decrease by 3 million people;**
- 10. Gold tops \$1900 ounce;**
- 11. Overall U.S. inflation rate 2 % or less;**
- 12. National debt exceeds productivity (exceeded as of Apr 12);**
- 13. Median worth of a Congressperson exceeds \$913,000;**
- 14. 10% increase in the one out of four American children already on food stamps;**
- 15. Americans with no health insurance increase to 50-60M;**
- 16. War vets with significant mental health problems, now 1/4 of returnees from the war zones, increase 5%;**
- 17. Suicides among military veterans increase 10%;**
- 18. At least 10 labor, food, tax, or squatter riots or protests;**
- 19. China shows less than 8% economic growth;**
- 20. President Obama re-elected in November.**

---

**APPENDIX 3. Predictions suggesting a start date for the Iran War as early as August 2012 and as late as December 31, 2013:**

**Prior to onset of predicted war with Iran:**

- 1. At least 50,000 additional US military and civilians deployed to sites within easy striking distance around Iran, adding to the 50,000 already there. This does not include personnel from US forces in Pakistan and Afghanistan but does include US personnel stationed at US military facilities Jebel Ali and Al Dahfra in the United Arab Emirates, Arifan in Kuwait, and Al Udeid in Qatar;**
- 2. At least 95% of Israeli Mossad personnel assigned to covert ops complete training in combat operations including deep penetration tactics at least three months prior to attack on Iran;**
- 3. The “mothership”, a US multipurpose floating base with air assault, commando ops, missile launch, and mine sweeping capabilities is positioned near or in the Persian Gulf at least one month prior to the attack on Iran;**
- 4. The mothership is provided with Mark 5 Zodiacs as well as Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats capable of carrying an entire SEAL squad;**
- 5. US forces buildup exceeds 5,000 personnel on the Yemeni island of Scototra alone, a short flying distance from Iran;**
- 6. US forces buildup exceeds 5,000 on Omani island of Masirah alone. Masirah is within easy striking distance of Iran and located just south of the Hormuz entry point;**
- 7. There is a negligible chance that Prime Minister Netanyahu wishes to delay the onset of the attack on Iran beyond 2012. Yet he must depend on US help. Psychologically, his aggressive personality traits coupled with messianic tendencies are well known. He will not change on his own accord. His party managed to delay elections so that he will be in power in Israel until October 2013. Thus the high-risk dates for Israel starting a war by direct or indirect means covers the next 14 months;**
- 8. Three US aircraft carriers—USS Abraham Lincoln, USS Carl Vinson, USS Enterprise-- and their strike groups, plus a French carrier—Charles de Gaulle--position themselves in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea at least one month prior to the onset of hostilities. A fourth US carrier strike group joins the largest-ever assembly of naval war vessels in the region in the last half-century.**



- 9. US forces buildup in Israel alone prior to outbreak of hostilities exceeds 5,000. Originally on site for the largest-ever joint missile defense exercise, the now-cancelled Austere Challenge, the US troops remain with their status changed from TDY to deployment;**
- 10. Iran continues to develop both its nuclear weapons enrichment program and its nuclear missile delivery systems. It may take up to 3 months after the onset of hostilities and several inspection teams to confirm this finding;**
- 11. Major polls report majority of Americans approve of Iran invasion if diplomatic talks fail to stop the development of Iran's nuclear weapons program;**
- 12. Iran will deny once more the validity of the November 2011 IAEA findings that it engaged in research or production activities that only are relevant to nuclear weapon development;**
- 13. US sanctions against Iran will not be lifted prior to engagement of hostilities. Sanctions were tightened in July by President Obama. The EU will reportedly attempt a full oil embargo against Iran in late June;**
- 14. Sometime this summer or early fall at the latest, US residents should expect at least a 15-20% increase in already record-high gasoline and petroleum products. This increase will be blamed in part on Iran. The effect on the American people will be a weakening of inhibitions toward going to war with a nation blamed for creating inflated prices for necessities;**
- 15. European groups underwriting Iran's maritime insurance will be reduced to 10% or less compared to 2011. Currently these European concerns underwrite 95% or more of maritime insurance in the world;**
- 16. The 5+1 nation diplomatic talks will not be declared non-productive by the US. The US will not refuse to attend talks up to the onset of hostilities. The talks already are seen as a sham by Israel who accuses Iran representatives of lying and stalling for more time;**
- 17. The upcoming talks are actually nonproductive and deadlocked with difficulty finding common ground except for the agreement to talk more. The prediction for this item is that the Western-backed incentive package seeking to end Iran's highest-level uranium enrichment as a first step will not be accepted by Iran during any of the talks. Iran has already announced that it will not give up any of its "nuclear rights";**
- 18. The US Congress will not declare war on Iran prior to hostilities. A resolution to employ a military option may or may not pass if Iran does**

**not cease and desist from their program to develop a nuclear weapons capability;**

- 19. At least 6 hours to 6 days prior to the onset of attack by US/Israel a false flag, demand that will not be followed by Iran, or other contrived trigger appears (e.g., breaking news which erroneously reports Iranian military have attacked US/Israel forces or facilities such as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which paved the way for the US to enter Vietnam; ultimatum ala Bush to Saddam Hussein that Ahmadinejad open key sites for inspection, leave the nation, or something else unlikely to occur, all within 48 hours or face attack);**
- 20. The US with the assistance of Israel attacks Iran sometime in 2012, at the latest at yearend 2013;**
- 21. The war starts with an at least 7-day air bombardment, drone attacks, cruise and other missiles launchings, and other airborne weapon deployment, by US/Israeli land, sea and air forces;**
- 22. The sum total of all bombs, bullets, missiles, and other firepower utilized by the US/Israel at the time victory is declared will be larger than from any other war in the history of the US;**
- 23. Stealth aircraft including the new stealth drones used in 50+ missions by US;**
- 24. Israeli UAVs including the new Eitan used in 20+ missions;**
- 25. Israel will attack Iran with at least 50 of its 128 US-purchased F-151 and F-161 aircraft modified with Israeli avionics and additional fuel tanks for long distance missions;**
- 26. Israel will make at least 100 missions with their US-built GBU-28 bunker busters carried by F-151 fighter-bombers;**
- 27. US submarines and Israeli German-built Dolphin submarines will deploy to the Persian Gulf region to take part in the US naval attack on Iran forces;**
- 28. At least 90% of Iran's navy of speedboats and aging big ships destroyed within 1 month after hostilities commence;**
- 29. At least 90% of Iran's stored offshore oil, consisting of up to 1 million barrels of crude stored in tankers or platforms or other facilities, will be captured or destroyed within one month after commencement of hostilities;**

- 30. At least 90% of Iran's air force of Russian-supplied MIG 295s and 35 year old American-built F14 Tomcat fighters destroyed within 1 month after start of war;**
- 31. At least 80 % of Iran's missile arsenal including the new solid fuel Shajjil-2 destroyed within 60 days after onset of hostilities;**
- 32. At least 90% of Iran's 1000 miles of coastline come under direct control of US/Israel forces within one month after hostilities commence., as evidenced by destruction/removal of at least 90% of Iran's military within several miles of the their coastline;**
- 33. No division or larger size units will deploy "boots on the ground" in Iran, that is, infantry and conventional forces of the US/Israel, within 1 month after the onset of hostilities. This does not include the overlapping categories of special force teams, commando raids, nuclear site inspection teams, airborne operations, specialized demolition teams, or other small group intrusions into Iran. After victory is secure, it is opined but not part of this prediction that conventional units of the US will be needed to secure sites associated with Iran's nuclear infrastructure, governmental and training facilities, as well as to nullify an anticipated resistance movement from defeated Iran;**
- 34. Non-stealth drones deployed in at least 150 attacks against Iran by both US;**
- 35. A total victory will be declared by U.S./Israel within 3 months of the initiation of hostilities;**
- 36. Casualties for U.S./Israel military combined will not exceed 999 deaths at the time victory is declared;**
- 37. Casualties for Iran's military exceeds 10000 within 3 months of the onset of hostilities, or at the time victory is declared, whichever occurs first;**
- 38. Iranian civilian losses predicted to exceed 30,000 within 3 months of the onset of hostilities as many of the target sites are in high-density population areas. The 30,000+ number should be determined by independent epidemiologists, not US/Israeli government workers. A second wave of deaths and incapacitations, not part of this prediction, will follow after the 3 month period due to secondary causes such as disease and the progressive effects of trauma;**
- 39. At least 90% of Iran's science and tech workers associated with military forces, training, research, any aspect of the nuclear infrastructure or defense work, are killed, captured, removed from their position, or otherwise nullified within 3 months of the onset of hostilities;**

- 40. Collateral sites destroyed, partially destroyed or controlled by US/Israeli military or civilian personnel include at least 10 universities, 10 other training sites, 10 government admin offices, and 10 other non-military sites;**
- 41. The conflict will be contained to Iran except for selected targets and aggressors (e.g., Israeli attacks on Hamas in Lebanon; Hezbollah in Gasa; attacks on Americans/Jewish people when visiting other countries). No country in the world will deploy conventional military forces inside Iran during hostilities or within 3 months of the declared victory by US/Israel;**
- 42. Within 3 months of media reports showing the use of a false flag or contrived trigger(s) for US/Israel invasion of Iran, American polls report that the majority of US citizens nevertheless do not favor withdrawal US forces. This was our experience for Iraq;**

**The above 42 predictions, conservative in this writer's opinion, are verifiable. An unknown number of the above predictions, however, may not be capable of verification, as the information may remain classified or otherwise unavailable until after victory is declared, if ever. Predictions that cannot be verified due to missing information should not be counted in the calculation of true positives and true negatives.**

---

**After the predicted war with Iran, to a large extent the US/Israel attack on Iran will likely be seen by most of the Muslim world as grossly disproportionate, morally outrageous, and hideously costly in terms of lives and material resources. There is little doubt that substantial numbers of the non-Muslim world will be negatively affected, and sympathize with the Iranians despite their contributions to the war. Muslim nations worldwide will lean more toward solidarity and common cause against this magnificent country which they see as implacably corrupt and declining as a would-be empire. Despite the language of conflict resolution and diplomacy, deep distrust and projection of blame is rife among the warring parties. Ominously, the foundation will be firm-set for a larger war against the West years later. (The majority of wars eventually breed second or third conflicts against the same adversary).**

---

APPENDIX 4 (repeated info): Session by Hall on team formation for prediction follows:

The basic idea of this session is to form teams in order to first (a) generate country or regional-specific predictions for distinct periods of

time corresponding to possible key events. My predictions? For the US this includes July-December 2012 (see Appendix ) during which time a conflict with Iran is likely to begin. The US in 2012 is unlikely to change its view on a nuclear-armed Iran, or even the capability for such, and has expressed a willingness for a military solution if Iran does not comply. The war with Iran could start as late as December 2013. During 2013-2014, a perfect economic storm is predicted to result in a crash, a Great Devaluation in asset values, and other crash-related events. For 2013-14, the US is predicted to go on high alert, as well as other countries, due to the stress and turmoil caused by the (predicted) economic crash. During 2014-2024, the US is likely to experience a recession/depression similar or worse than the Great Depression. For 2014-2024, the depression will cause a loss a revenue and hence a very conservative and unyielding stance towards nuclear issues. The 2020s will likely usher in a transformation on the order of the Glorious Revolution, American Revolution, American Civil War, and WWII. The 2020s, will be the highest risk period for general war and hence the temptation to use nuclear weapons, especially if they are losing a conventional or asymmetric war by non-nuclear nations. As discussed more in detail, and in keeping with general wars in the West during the last half-millennium, during a general war nations use the most destructive weapons at their disposal. During general wars the mindset of the warriors and warrior leaders is one of implacable hatred, black and white mentation, rigidity of thought, and an attitude of giving no quarter or compromise to the perceived enemy. The end of the 2020s or the start of the 2030s we will likely see a different America.

At the onset, each team will consider the status of nuclear weaponry and the threat of nuclear war for each period at the onset of the group process, and built it into their predictions. At the end of each critical period, each team can write down possible inhibitors to violence and war, specific to the events they believe will occur.

The predicted events in this article, if quantitatively framed and capable of verification at the end of the temporal period, should be regarded as testable hypotheses. These prognostications are verified or not at the end of each temporal period, and the inaccurate predictions modified or deleted for the next temporal period. Part of the process of modification of wrong predictions involves a systematic study of ones biases and motivations. The predictions in this exercise are merely a way of

keeping score, a measurement of current status. They should not be confused with intervention. The Delphi Method is the recommended technique for teams to generate predictions. Here a group of experts write on paper a list of predictions for a possible event such as the start of a war, keeping that predictive process individual and not part of a group process. Then a second list is prepared after the predictions from the other team members are made available and open discussion on the rationale behind their predictions. Finally, a third list of predictions is submitted, this set being individually prepared and without group input. Overall, this method combines the best features of group versus individual problem solving. Using the Delphi Method, the Pacific Institute accurately predicted the onset and characteristics of the 1990 Gulf War as well as the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Dr. Dengli Shin as well as other experts from the PRC correctly predicted events related to nuclear issues and North Korea. Variations of the method are presented at the end of this article for consideration.

Ultimately, each of us has a notion of what will transpire in the future. This conference may help articulate, measure and refine those ideas in regards to nuclear issues. This places us in the position of providing a choice as to whether we behave in a manner consistent with our beliefs. A grim picture is painted If the predictions of the Pacific Institute turn out accurate.

The second (b) task of each team is to initiate and recommend positive methods to create among people positive feedback loops in order to increase trust, respect, bonding, genuine communication, and other like values and practices.

Good intervention by a person, family, nation, or international entity follows good prediction. Effective peace intervention, for example, implies knowledge of likely outcomes absent application of recommended conflict-resolution strategies. The following 62 US-related trend-based predictions are proffered for the remainder of 2012, except for Iran war-related events that may occur by the end of 2013. The US/Israel is at high risk to wage war against Iran, as soon as late summer/early fall and at the latest by the end of next year. An algorithm to predict individual or collective violence based on trends is proffered. Depending on degree of accuracy, the credibility of further prediction efforts for different temporal periods can be assessed. These

distinct periods, not discussed in this paper but involving key American interests and those of the world polity, cover the end of a long cycle for the US that started in 1946, the latest of 5 Anglo-American long cycles for the last half millennium. A economic perfect storm is predicted to hit the US during 2013-2014; predicted events include a crash, a great currency devaluation, high joblessness, currency wars, trade wars, and the continuation of limited hot wars. A decade-long depression/recession will follow. The primary period of interest is the 2020s during which decade cyclic-based predictions suggest global transformational events.

End of conference notes.

Thank you for reviewing them and telling me if we have a "GO"!

This document was created with Win2PDF available at <http://www.win2pdf.com>.  
The unregistered version of Win2PDF is for evaluation or non-commercial use only.  
This page will not be added after purchasing Win2PDF.